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This case looks into Occidental Petroleum’s acquisition of Anadarko Petroleum, one of the latest 
energy megadeals. It presents an overview of the bidding process between the two potential 
acquirers, Occidental and Chevron, the rationale and arranged financing structure behind 
Occidental’s bids, as well as Warren Buffett’s preferred stock investment and the opposition of 
activist investor Carl Icahn. The supporting teaching note provides an analysis of several topics 
related to corporate finance, particularly, acquisition payment types and financing sources, distinct 
valuation techniques and the roles of the buyer and the seller’s management and board of directors 
in M&A. 
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The Race for Anadarko 
 
On April 12, 2019, Vicki Hollub, President, Director and CEO of Occidental Petroleum stood 
restless at the window of her office at the company’s headquarters in the Greenway Plaza in 
Houston, Texas, as Chevron Corporation and Anadarko Petroleum announced the execution of a 
merger agreement. Hollub had been pursuing Anadarko for nearly two years, and was now fighting 
head-to-head with Michael K. Wirth, Chairman and CEO of Chevron, in an intense bidding war 
that turned out to be the most high-profile public contest in the oil and gas exploration and 
production sector since the 1980s. 
 
The saga began in July 2017 when Vicki Hollub approached Al Walker, Anadarko’s then 
Chairman, President and CEO, to discuss the potential benefits of a merger between the two 
companies. An Occidental-Anadarko alliance would culminate in the creation of a global energy 
leader with a substantial presence in the Permian Basin, the oil field that turned the United States 
into the world’s top oil producer in 20181. The initial offer by Occidental Petroleum was made on 
September 27, 2017. Anadarko’s Board rejected the deal arguing the offer left too much risk for 
its shareholders, and later jumped into negotiations with Chevron after it had made its own 
acquisition proposal in 2019. The fierce bidding war that ensued between Occidental and Chevron 
drew CEO Vicki Hollub and longtime activist investor Carl Icahn into a corporate governance 
standoff. The trigger was a controversial and expensive deal struck with Warren Buffett’s 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. that allowed Hollub to avoid a shareholder vote on Anadarko’s takeover. 
Buffett’s investment empowered Occidental to outbid Chevron and finally declare victory. 
 
The largest energy merger in recent years closed on August 8. Once again, a governance battle 
picked up as Icahn ran a proxy fight to oust Hollub and her Board. The outrage was prompted by 
his loss of confidence in their ability to secure the best interests of Occidental shareholders, after 
what he considered to have been a failed “massive $57 billion levered bet on the price of oil”2. 
                                                 
1 The New York Times 
2 Carl Icahn’s Open Letter to Occidental Petroleum Stockholders 




The American Oil and Gas Industry 
 
In 1870, John D. Rockefeller and Henry Flagler established the Standard Oil Company to enter 
the thriving oil industry after borrowing funds to take control of what had become the largest 
refinery in Cleveland. The oil firm expanded its business through horizontal integration with the 
acquisition of rival refineries across the United States and rapidly gained control over the 
production, refining, distribution and marketing segments, until it accounted for 90% of U.S. oil 
supply in the late 1890s. In 1911, Rockefeller’s monopoly was hit by a formal lawsuit, and ordered 
by the Supreme Court to be broken up into 34 independent firmsi. The dismantlement of the oil 
monopoly stimulated competition in the American oil industry and, by 1945, the United States had 
become the largest oil producer in the world, responsible for more than half of global oil 
production. 
 
With a declining rate of oil field discoveries in national territory and a soaring demand triggered 
by World War II, the United States turned to foreign petroleum reserves in rich oil-producing 
Persian Gulf nations, where a few multinational companies owned vast concessions. Amongst 
these corporations were the “Seven Sisters”, comprised of Texaco, Gulf Oil, Anglo Persian Oil 
Company and Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil descendants, Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
Standard Oil of New York and Standard Oil of California. This multinational oil consortium 
established valuable partnerships with local Middle Eastern governments, and eventually took 
control of prices and production in the global oil industry. Meanwhile, the discontentment of oil-
producing states over the monopolistic power of the Seven Sisters led to their retaliation through 
the establishment of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), formed by 
the oil ministers of Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. The Middle Eastern group 
slowly gained territory in the industry through negotiations with the U.S. companies and 
implemented measures to prevent abrupt cuts in the price of oil, including production slashes.  
 
However, despite the apparent collaboration between the two oil producing regions, the escalating 
Arab-Israel conflict gave rise to a global oil crisis in 1973 that proved to be the turning point for 
the Seven Sisters and the United States’ clear industry dominance. As OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, 
condemned the U.S. for its support of Israel by launching a full embargo and setting up unilateral 
price increases, the Seven Sisters were forced to disintegrate into seven individual companies after 
losing large concessions in the Middle East. With the end of what was considered the “Golden 




Age of Oil”, the United States focused on domestic production to rely less on foreign oil supply 
and reduce its exposure to geopolitical clashesii. 
 
A New Era for the United States 
 
When the global energy crisis severely hit the United States, a critical source of the commodity 
used to stabilize the domestic market was the Permian Basin, a sedimentary system of thick shale 
rock deposits covering an area of 75,000 square miles that spans parts of Southeast New Mexico 
and Western Texas (Exhibit 1A). The region has unique geological features as it contains multiple 
layers of rock that result from around 320 million years of sedimentation, enabling one well to 
produce both oil and natural gasiii. As drilling became less profitable due to the dramatic decrease 
in crude oil prices from international conflicts, production in the Permian Basin fell considerably. 
Meanwhile, new extraction techniques developed significantly including hydraulic fracturing, or 
fracking, which consists in shooting a mixture of water, sand and chemicals at extremely high 
pressure to fracture the rock and release the oil and gas trapped underneath. In the 2000s, horizontal 
drilling became common in the Permian Basin, allowing producers to target multiple formations 
from a single location at the surface with wells stretching for large distances. These two techniques 
were particularly effective in the Delaware Basin given its thick layers of rock and extended depth 
relative to other sub-basins of the Permian (Exhibit 1B). 
 
In the 2010s, the combined use of the two methods set the stage for the shale revolution that turned 
the United States into a crude oil superpower and put the Permian Basin in the heartland of the 
U.S. shale boom. In the supply glut of 2014, crude prices in the United States plunged 50% 
(Exhibit 2A) and, while many oil producers in the Permian Basin scaled back their production to 
prevent further losses, the ones that pulled through were well-positioned to drive the Permian to 
new heights. In 2018, the United States finally surpassed Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the 
world’s leading oil producer (Exhibit 2B) driven by the Permian Basin’s then-daily production of 
over 3 million barrelsiv. As the New Mexico-Texas basin became the pot of gold for drillers across 
the country, several companies began competing fiercely to expand their presence in region.  
 
The dwindling prices in the end of 2018 hit the valuation of exploration and production (“E&P”) 
companies, which were trading at 10-year lows. With fragile balance sheets, weak cash flow 
generation and deteriorating credit ratings, smaller oil drillers struggled to raise capital for further 
expansion in the Permian Basinv. The ambition for larger areas with drilling rights to better manage 




production logistics and maximize well utilization in the region led to a consolidation trend to 
achieve efficiencies and synergiesvi, favoured by the modest prices of struggling oil drillers. 
 




Occidental Petroleum was founded in 1920 in Los Angeles and it remained a small and nearly 
bankrupt oil driller until Armand Hammer invested $50,000 into two wells owned by the company 
in 1956. After the discovery of a rich crude oil deposit in Southern California and a large natural 
gas field in Northern California, Hammer rapidly acquired a controlling stake in the company and 
expanded its business globally. Occidental vaulted into its prime time in the international oil 
industry when Hammer secured major oil concessions in the Middle East, particularly in Libya in 
1966, where it held the largest domestic oil drilling concessionvii.  
 
In the 1980s, as tensions rose between the United States and the Middle East, Occidental 
announced the divesture of one-fourth of its Libyan oil-producing assets, two weeks following the 
all-cash sale of its Colombia holdings to Royal Dutch Shell for $1 billionviii. The company sought 
to decrease the risk embedded in its foreign operations where demand was shrinking and political 
tensions intensified. As such, in a considerable change to its traditional business, Occidental turned 
to the North Sea and North America. In 1982, it entered the natural gas pipeline segment with the 
acquisition of the Cities Service Company, holder of 2.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in 
Kansas and Oklahoma, drifting away from its pure-play oil driller status. Later in 1986, the firm 
acted as a “white knight” for Midcon Corporation in the hostile takeover bid by WB Partners and 
gained access to its 30,000 miles long natural gas pipelines, the largest in the United States. This 
extensive gas pipeline system would allow Occidental to put its previously acquired reserves from 
the Cities Service Company to full use and unlock new earnings and cash flowix. 
 
In 1990, Ray R. Irani took over as Chairman and CEO. After Hammer’s 30-year leadership, 
Occidental now owned far-flung holdings that spanned across coal mining, the manufacturing of 
fertilizers, chemicals and plastics, the processing and marketing of meat and horse breeding. The 
company had diversified its activity in order to reduce its exposure to the oil industry and had 
become a conglomerate of unrelated business entities. Irani’s era at Occidental was marked by the 
transformation of the firm into one of the largest oil and gas companies by equity capitalization in 
the United States, as he strengthened Occidental’s chemicals and oil and gas activities by selling 




operations across other industries including the previously acquired Midcon’s meat business. In 
October 2010, after an annual shareholder meeting, Irani informed the board of directors of his 
intention to step down from his role as CEO. Consequently, in May 2011, Stephen Chazen was 
designated Occidental’s President and Chief Executive Officer, while Irani became Executive 
Chairman and was given full responsibility for the firm’s operations in the Middle Eastx. 
 
For the following two years, Chazen tried to shift Occidental’s focus to domestic oil fields to take 
advantage of the shale oil boom and reiterated his long-standing view to split the firm’s activities 
by divesting the Middle Eastern operations, which accounted for 40% of its oil and 35% of its gas 
production in 2012. The rationale for this strategic move relied on Occidental’s underwhelming 
share price performance, with the stock tumbling 5% in the twelve months up to April 29, 2013 
(Exhibit 3). Chazen believed that valuing the United States portion separately would allow 
Occidental’s stock to trade at closer multiples to its peer group. On the other hand, Irani, who had 
been developing the firm’s business in the Middle East, strongly disagreed. In a shareholder 
meeting in May 2013, the two-year boardroom struggle between Ray Irani and Stephen Chazen 
culminated in Irani’s early retirement and exit from Occidental’s board, while Chazen remained 
CEO until the end of 2014xi. 
 
In Stephen Chazen’s final year at the helm of Occidental, the firm failed to sell a 40% stake in its 
Middle Eastern assets to a consortium of three state-owned firms in the Persian Gulf, in a 
transaction that aimed to raise at least $8 billion for drilling and share buybacksxii. The deal, which 
resulted from a restructuring plan, would contribute to the firm’s strategic objective of streamlining 
operations and boosting profitability essentially by divesting low margin and return oil and gas 
assets, and investing in the high margin operations in the thriving Permian Basin. 
 
Building a Permian Leader 
 
In April 2016, as part of Occidental’s corporate governance commitment to change the chairman 
every five years and to prohibit former chief executives from serving as chairmen, Vicki A. Hollub 
succeeded Stephen I. Chazen as President and CEO, becoming the first woman to run a major 
American oil company. Hollub had a long tenure at Occidental, having joined the company in 
1982 when it acquired Cities Services, and had been serving as Chief Operating Officer prior to 
the promotion. During her time as COO, Vicki was responsible for wells in Texas and other states, 




which generated $12 billion in sales in 2014, and also led the company’s expansion in the Permian 
Basin that, eventually, became one of the most relevant profit sources for Occidentalxiii. 
 
Vicki had committed to the firm’s strategy to focus on the Permian Basin, and in the first two years 
as CEO, Hollub oversaw the sale of non-core operations in the Middle East and North Africa, and 
non-operated properties and midstream assets in South and South Central Texas, as well as the 
acquisition of 35,000 net acres in the Permian Basin and interests in other Permian Enhanced Oil 
Recovery (EOR) properties. As of December 31, 2018, domestic operations, focused on the 
Permian Basin, accounted for close to 57% of total production, while 5% derived from its 
properties in Colombia, and the remaining 38% resulted from activities in Oman, Qatar and the 
UAExiv.  
 
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 
 
With Occidental seeking to become the leading producer in the Permian Basin, CEO Vicki eyed 
Anadarko as a way to propel the company’s dominance in the region. Anadarko engages in the 
exploration, development, production and sale of oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids (“NGLs”) 
from operations in the United States, accounting for 90% of its proved reserves, onshore and 
deepwater Gulf of Mexico, as well as other regions including Algeria, Ghana and Colombia 
(Exhibit 4). In Mozambique, together with other partners, Anadarko developed one of the largest 
greenfield liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) facilities worldwide with the construction of a $20 billion 
gas liquefaction and export terminal with an annual capacity of 12.88 million tonnes. In addition 
to its upstream oil and gas operations, Anadarko gathers, processes, treats and transports its own 
and third-party oil, natural gas and NGLs, as well as gathers and disposes produced water through 
the assets owned in subsidiary Western Midstream Partners, LP and its Other Midstream 
segmentxv. According to Reuters, at the end of 2018, Anadarko owned proved reserves of more 
than 1 billion barrels-equivalent, making it one of the largest independent E&P firms (Exhibit 5). 
 
Within its principal position in the Delaware Basin, Anadarko operated close to 750 wells and 
owned interests in 450 non-operated wells in 2018. Through the extraction of oil and gas using 
horizontal drilling techniques, the firm has benefitted from an optimized cost structure and superior 
production delivery. In the DJ Basin in Colorado where liquids and natural gas are abundant in the 
Niobrara and Codell formations, Anadarko held a premier position of 460,000 net acres, operating 
3,400 vertical wells and 1,700 horizontal wells, as of the end of 2018. Throughout the year, the 




firm managed to generate sales from 278 of operated wells in the region and improved its footage 
driller per rig-day in 30%xvi. 
 
Al Walker joined Anadarko in 2005 when he was named Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief 
Financial Officer (“CFO”) after serving as a Managing Director for the Global Energy Group of 
UBS Investment Bank. He was appointed CEO in 2012 while working as Anadarko’s chief 
operating officer following the resignation of previous CEO Jim Hackett who became the firm’s 
Executive Chairmanxvii. When he assumed the leadership of the company, Walker stated that he 
would resume Anadarko’s long-term strategy to “deliver a competitive and sustainable rate of 
return to shareholders”3 through production ramp-ups and growing exploration of off-shore 
drilling, which enabled the firm to more than double oil sales from 2016 to 2018 (Exhibit 6). As 
Anadarko divested its non-core assets over the past three years, the company was able to focus on 
the expansion of its high margin operations in oil-rich basins, which required them to incur further 
debt for the development of WES midstream infrastructure (Exhibit 7 and 8). 
 
The Bidding War 
 
The Initial Attempt 
 
In July 2017, Vicki Hollub contacted Al Walker to express Occidental’s interest in pursuing an 
acquisition of Anadarko. Hollub believed the combination of the two firms’ assets would create a 
global energy leader with dominance in shale development within the Permian and DJ basin in the 
United States. Anadarko could leverage Occidental’s expertise in shale development to extract 
more oil from its fields, and the combined company had the potential to generate high impact 
synergies in respect to capital expenditure efficiency and domestic cost-cutting, particularly in 
procurement and supply chain logistics. On September 27, Occidental’s management sent a letter 
to Walker proposing to acquire Anadarko in an all-stock transaction offering $61.22 per share of 
Anadarko, at an exchange ratio of 0.9500 (Exhibit 9). In the proposal, Hollub outlined the rationale 
for the merger and stated that, upon the closing of the proposed transaction, Occidental aimed to 
maintain its dividend policy and undertake a significant share repurchase. 
  
Following a regular meeting of Anadarko’s Board in November, Occidental’s offer was 
unanimously rejected. Despite the 23% premium offered, Anadarko’s directors questioned the 
                                                 
3 Anadarko 2018 Annual Report 




strategic rationale of the acquisition, as the distinct and disparate strategies and asset profiles of 
the two companies would complicate post-merger integration and value optimization for 
shareholders. The size of the transaction could likely impact the sustainability of Occidental’s pro-
forma dividend policy and, thus, require the combined company to go through significant asset 
disposals. Anadarko’s Board also contested the proposed payment method, since the 100% stock 
merger compensation would notably expose Anadarko’s shareholders to downward movements in 
Occidental’s share price from the announcement to the closing of the deal, ultimately affecting its 
shareholders’ stake in the combined company. As such, Anadarko’s Board found that it would be 
illogical and against its fiduciary duties to accept Occidental’s proposal. 
 
On January 19, 2018, Hollub made a cash-and-stock offer, upping its bid to $38 billion from the 
previous $31 billion, offering no more than 50% in cash. Once again, Anadarko’s Board turned 
down the proposal given its confidence in the firm’s future prospects as a standalone company and 
unwillingness to the take the risks involved in a transaction with a considerable stock 
consideration.xviii 
 
Enter the Rival Chevron 
 
On February 6, 2019, Chevron joined Occidental in its pursuit of Anadarko as CEO Michael Wirth 
sent a letter to Al Walker offering $64 per share at a 31% premium in a 25% cash and 75% common 
stock transaction. At the end of 2018, oil prices had taken another dive and Chevron took 
advantage of the opportunity to launch an offer for Anadarko, which had suffered a 27% drop in 
share price in December (Exhibit 10). Through the $47 billion combination with Anadarko, 
Chevron expected to boost its acreage in the Permian Basin, with the integration of Anadarko’s 
240,000 net acres in the Delaware Basin, enabling the firm to extract more oil from its wells and 
realize significant reductions in its cost per barrel. Furthermore, the transaction offered Chevron a 
55% stake in Western Midstream Partners, expanding the buyer’s presence in the midstream 
segment of the oil and gas industry, in which it had not been as well-established.  
 
For Anadarko, the complementarity of Chevron’s assets in the Permian Basin, its track record in 
the effective integration of acquired companies, and experience across large LNG projects would 
facilitate the transaction and the expected value creation, including the materialization of $1 billion 
in run-rate cost synergies and capital spending reductions of $1 billion in 2020 xix. As such, and 
taking into account its fiduciary duties, Anadarko’s Board decided to explore a deal with Chevron. 




Later in March, Hollub and Walker ran into each other at the American Petroleum Institute 
Conference and informally conveyed Occidental’s enduring interest in a merger with Anadarko. 
Walker decided to take advantage of Occidental’s willingness to resume merger talks and managed 
to impel Wirth to push up Chevron’s purchase price to $65 per share. In an attempt to rekindle 
negotiations with Anadarko, on March 23, Occidental’s CEO Vicki Hollub sent a letter to Al 
Walker proposing to acquire the company for $19 in cash plus 0.8737 shares of Occidental 
common stock, valuing Anadarko at $76 per share. Hollub also stated that the proposed acquisition 
would not be restricted to any financing condition, thus, eliminating one of Anadarko’s main 
concerns in previous bids. 
 
While evaluating Occidental’s proposal, Anadarko’s Board highlighted that the equity portion 
offered brought up the same issues from earlier proposals regarding the significant uncertainties 
attached to a stock transaction and inherent to Occidental’s poor performance in the market. It 
further noted that, unlike Chevron’s proposal, Hollub’s offer would require the approval of 
Occidental shareholders of two majority votes on the acquisition, and reliance on third-party 
financing. Despite the concerns over a combination with Occidental, Anadarko’s Board 
determined that the price embedded in Occidental’s proposal could yield superior value to 
Anadarko’s shareholders. With Wirth refusing to increase Chevron’s purchase price, Anadarko 
entered into a mutual non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) with Occidental and kicked off the due 
diligence process. 
 
Nevertheless, negotiations between the two oil drillers soon started falling apart as Hollub and 
Walker were unable to reach a consensus on the terms of a draft merger agreement. On March 30, 
Occidental sent a first draft to Anadarko outlining the structure of the deal under a fixed exchange 
ratio with no collar or other value protection mechanisms. In addition, it stated that the transaction 
would be subject to the majority approval of Occidental shareholders of the issuance of new shares 
and a majority shareholder vote in favour of the Occidental Charter Amendment (“OCA”), an 
amendment on the firm’s certificate of incorporation to raise its capital stock in order to issue the 
amount of shares contemplated by the transaction.  
 
Given the high threshold of shareholder approval required for the two votes, and seeking to protect 
Anadarko from a disapproval outcome, which would jeopardize a deal with Chevron, Walker 
included several provisions in a revised draft merger agreement such as an Acquiror Vote-Down 
Payment equal to 7.5% of Occidental’s pre-transaction equity value. Furthermore, in what was 




called an Initial Closing Certainty Proposal, Anadarko advocated for an increase in the cash 
component of the merger consideration, in case Occidental failed to obtain stockholder approval 
for the OCA. The higher amount of cash would reduce the amount of the new shares to be issued 
in connection to the transaction so that the OCA would no longer be required to ensure the 
execution of the merger. Vicki Hollub felt that the OCA did not present any meaningful risk to 
Anadarko and rejected the Initial Closing Certainty and Acquiror Vote-Down Payment. With 
Hollub’s reluctance in accepting Anadarko’s conditions for the merger and, in order to mitigate 
the risk of a no-transaction scenario, Anadarko’s legal advisor, Wachtell Lipton, turned to Chevron 
to confirm whether its offer was still at the table and later began discussing the terms of a merger 
agreement. 
 
On April 8, Vicki Hollub sent an e-mail to Michael Walker containing a revised proposal with a 
40-60 split between cash and stock at the cost of a lower purchase price of $72 per share. Although 
the larger cash consideration eliminated the need for shareholder approval of the OCA, it still 
required the majority vote on the issuance of Occidental common shares, according to rules of the 
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), where Occidental’s stock was listed.  
 
While Occidental was still showing some resistance in accepting Anadarko’s terms, Chevron 
seemed to be more flexible and open for discussion of contractual terms, having decreased the 
termination fee to from $1.5 to $1 billion, or from 3.25% to 3% of Anadarko’s equity value implied 
by the transaction. In this light, going forward with Occidental’s proposal would imply losing the 
possibility of a transaction with Chevron and accepting the high risk of not obtaining the approval 
of Occidental shareholders of the share issuance vote. Furthermore, Anadarko would have to bear 
the uncertainty regarding the impact of a transaction announcement on Occidental’s share price 
and how it would harm Anadarko shareholders given the high equity portion on its offer.  
 
Anadarko’s management and advisors deliberated on the course of action to take regarding the 
two bidders and concluded that Anadarko should focus its efforts on bringing the Chevron 
transaction to fruition. The decision focused on the strategic benefits of the deal, which included 
the complementarity of both companies’ portfolio, Chevron’s expertise in operating LNG projects 
and offshore assets, its low post-transaction leverage resulting in a lower cost of capital and fewer 
asset sales from the combined entity. As such, Al Walker believed that Chevron would create 
greater short- and long-term value for Anadarko shareholders and provide certainty of execution 
and completionxxi. 




The Push from Warren Buffett 
 
Although on April 12 Chevron and Anadarko had issued a press release announcing the execution 
of a merger agreement, Vicki Hollub still had Anadarko in her sight. On April 24, Occidental 
publicly disclosed that it had sent a revised proposal to Anadarko’s Board offering $76, half in 
cash and half in stock at an exchange ratio of 0.6094. This time, Hollub had increased the bid’s 
cash consideration, providing greater immediate value and making the offer more appealing to 
Anadarko shareholders, pledging substantial cost savings and a stable dividend payout. As a 
counterbid from Chevron was yet a possible outcome, pressure mounted on Occidental’s 
management to effectively lock in the acquisition of Anadarko. While the April 24 Revised 
Proposal yielded superior value compared to Chevron’s last bid, and failure to engage in such 
transaction would question the management and board's fiduciary duties towards shareholders, 
Anadarko’s concerns regarding the closing certainty of the deal had not yet been fully tackled. 
Despite offering a larger cash portion than previous offers, Occidental shareholders’ majority vote 
on the issuance of new shares was still required for the transaction to go forwardxxii.  
 
Under the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), which applies to both Occidental and 
Anadarko, when the shares issued as part of a takeover offer constitute no more than 20% of the 
acquiring company’s outstanding common shares, the buyer’s board no longer requires the 
approval of shareholders on the respective acquisitionxxiii. If Vicki Hollub could restructure the 
payment method offered to be compliant with the DGCL in this matter, the vote from Occidental 
shareholders on the transaction would no longer be required, and Occidental could finally clinch 
a deal with Anadarko. In the April 24 Revised Proposal, the issuable shares represented close to 
40% of Occidental’s outstanding common stock, which required Hollub to resort to external 
financing to raise the cash consideration in a brand-new bid to lower the equity share below 20%. 
 
Given the vulnerability of oil prices and their exposure to its fluctuations, oil and gas companies 
tend to present low debt ratios. With the incurrence of new indebtedness of $21.8 billion in bank 
loans to finance the merger’s cash consideration, and the assumption of Anadarko’s and Western 
Midstream Partners’ short- and long-term debt of $11.9 and $7.3 billion, respectively, Occidental 
was expected to have close to $40 billion of net debt pre-asset sales lying on its balance sheetxxiv. 
Adding further debt to this substantial amount of leverage was not a viable option as it would likely 
result in a steep downgrade of Occidental’s credit rating from A to triple-B, second-lowest high-
grade S&P rating, and rise its then-current cost of debt of 4.34%, according to Bloomberg. 




While looking for financing alternatives, Vicki Hollub went to Omaha, the city home to billionaire 
investor Warren Buffett, where the two discussed Occidental’s takeover of Anadarko. In just 90 
minutes, Hollub managed to convince Buffett to provide financial support of the deal. On April 
30, Occidental announced that Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway had committed $10 billion in cash to 
finance the acquisition of Anadarko in exchange for 100,000 shares of Occidental preferred stock 
returning 8% annually, close to four times larger than the return on the S&P500 index. With a cash 
pile of $112 billion and struggling to find multibillion-dollar deals, or “elephants” as Buffett would 
call them, Occidental Petroleum was an attractive investment. Apart from the yearly payment of 
$800 million on Occidental preferred stock, Buffett received warrants worth $1.2 billionxxv to 
purchase 80 million Occidental common shares at $62.50 a share, above its then-current price of 
$58.88. With the expectation that Occidental’s price was set to climb above the warrants’ exercise 
price in the coming years, Berkshire could become the owner of approximately 10% of 
Occidental’s outstanding common stock at a considerably lower costxxvi,xxvii, xxviii. 
 
Fortunately for Hollub and Occidental’s Board, Buffett’s endorsement of the deal provided 
tailwind to Occidental’s proposal. On May 5, Occidental revealed it had set forth a revised proposal 
offering $59 and 0.2934 shares of Occidental common stock for each common share of Anadarko, 
maintaining last bid’s purchase price of $76, which the Anadarko Board accepted on the following 
day. The transaction value of the acquisition would make it the largest amongst exploration and 
production since 2015 (Exhibit 11). Through Berkshire Hathaway’s capital injection, Vicki 
Hollub paved the way toward winning the backing of Anadarko’s Board and seeing off its rival 
Chevron. With the new larger amount of cash, Hollub managed to lower the equity portion offered 
to 19.58% of Occidental’s outstanding common stock and eliminated the Occidental shareholders’ 
vote on the share issuance, under the DGCL, relieving Anadarko’s fears of running into resistance.  
 
In the new proposal, Hollub reiterated the complementarity of Anadarko’s assets with 
Occidental’s, particularly in the Delaware Basin (Exhibit 12) which, combined with substantial 
scale in other locations, could result in annual primary synergies of $2 billion and $1.5 billion in 
capital reduction (Exhibit 13).  The combined entity would be approximately 60% larger, as 
measured by revenues in the first quarter of 2019 of $6.5 billion, compared to Occidental’s 
standalone sales of $4.0 billion (Exhibit 14A). Between Buffett’s backing and Occidental’s last 
bid, Hollub also flew to France and agreed to sell Anadarko’s business operations, assets and 
liabilities in Algeria, Ghana, Mozambique and South Africa to the French energy company Total 
for a total of $8.8 billion. The proceeds from the divesture of these non-core assets to Occidental 




would be used to retire part of its debt outstanding of $42.93 billion on Occidental’s pro forma 
balance sheet (Exhibit 14B), along with other planned $10-15 billion asset salesxxix. 
 
Carl Icahn’s Activist Response 
 
Throughout the endless bidding war with Chevron, as Hollub increased the purchase price for 
Anadarko, contracted $21.8 billion of further bank debt and other expensive financing, such as 
Warren Buffett’s preferred stock investment, there was lack of input from Occidental shareholders. 
As the holder of 5% of Occidental’s common shares as of May 30, valued at $1.6 billionxxx, activist 
investor Carl Icahn was a vocal critic of Occidental’s deal to acquire Anadarko. On July 22, in a 
letter to remaining shareholders, Icahn publicly expressed his outrage over the negligence of the 
Board and Hollub to go ahead with what he considered to have been a high-risk, transformational 
merger, without a stockholder votexxxi.  
 
Although Occidental’s management had pledged not to engage in high-risk M&A and maintain a 
prudent balance sheet, it had broken this commitment, in his view, at the expense of shareholder 
rights. Icahn believed that the Anadarko deal was a poison pill to grow considerably and prevent 
a hostile takeover from an industry rival, given its weakened market performance during the year, 
allowing Hollub and the directors in Occidental’s Board to retain their jobs. In order to avoid 
further breaches of the board and management’s fiduciary duties towards himself and other 
Occidental shareholders, Icahn sued Hollub and her Board and opened a proxy fight to oust her 
and four board members. As his war against Occidental escalated, Icahn proposed to cut the Board 
even further by firing all of its 10 members. 
 
“Owning this company, and being at the mercy of a board and CEO who have already shown 
they are willing to take inordinate risks and gamble stockholders money to further their own 
agendas, is extremely dangerous for an investor.” 
- Carl Icahn 
 
Despite having sold 10 million shares of Occidental, Icahn still owned a significant amount of 23 
million shares, valued at $900 million as of November 8, 2019. While he condemned the 
heightened exposure of the new combined company to oil price changes and monstrous balance 
sheet debt as consequences of the Anadarko purchase, Icahn still acknowledged that Occidental 
owns distinguished assets, particularly in the Permian Basin, and pays a flattering dividend. Instead 
of closing his position in Occidental entirely, Icahn used his activist investor status to force 
changes to the company’s corporate governance in the hopes of lifting its long-term valuexxxii. 
















Source: Engle, Mark et al. 2016. “Geochemistry of formation waters from the Wolfcamp and ‘Cline’ shales: Insights 



















Exhibit 2B: Top 3 Largest Oil Producers, 2010-2018 
 
 








































































Exhibit 3: Share Price Comparison of Occidental and Energy Select Sector Index 
 
 







































Energy Selector Sector Index
(rebased to Occidental)








Note: EBITDAX defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortization and exploration expense. 
 
Source: Bloomberg, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
 




Source: Adapted from Anadarko SEC Filing for March 31, 2019 


















Stock Market Data as of 03/31/2019
Ticker PXD CXO HES DVN APA APC OXY
Shares Outstanding 169,499 200,257 291,435 450,000 374,696 489,400 749,390
Stock Price ($) 151.27 111.15 62.63 30.74 34.73 46.65 66.07
Market Value of Equity 25,639,311 22,257,936 18,251,753 13,832,748 13,011,557 22,828,222 49,509,495
Net Debt 1,016,000 4,353,000 3,978,000 3,533,000 7,490,000 15,122,000 7,284,000
Equity Beta Over Latest 6 Months 1.22 1.23 1.47 1.34 1.16 — 1.05
Financial Data as of 03/31/2019
Trailing Twelve Months
Sales 8,817,000 3,933,000 6,326,000 11,654,000 7,293,000 12,837,000 17,824,000
EBITDA 2,912,000 3,374,000 2,420,000 3,576,000 3,792,000 6,328,000 9,507,000
EBIT 1,378,000 1,896,000 537,000 1,780,000 1,387,000 2,074,000 5,530,000
EBITDAX 3,375,000 2,937,000 2,304,000 2,092,000 4,863,000 7,656,000 9,624,000
Operating Metrics as of 12/31/3018
Proved Reserves of Oil, LNG and NatGas (MBOE) 863,629 803,926 952,690 1,214,607 874,005 1,002,221 2,217,204
2016 2017 2018 03/31/2019
Revenues and Other
Oil Sales 4,668 6,552 9,206 2,096
Natural-Gas Sales 1,564 1,348 1,005 320
Natural-Gas Liquids Sales 921 1,069 1,271 240
Gathering, Processing, and Marketing Sales 1,294 2,000 1,588 470
Gains (Losses) on Divestitures and Other, net (578) 939 312 92
Total 7,869 11,908 13,382 3,218
Costs and Expenses
Oil and Gas Operating 807 988 1,153 289
Oil and Gas Transportation 1,002 914 878 222
Exploration 944 2,535 459 49
Gathering, Processing, and Marketing 1,083 1,552 1,047 256
General and Administrative 1,223 994 1,084 267
Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization 4,301 4,279 4,254 1,081
Production, Property, and Other Taxes 536 582 826 199
Impairments 227 408 800 —
Other Operating Expense 118 221 262 21
Total 10,241 12,473 10,763 2,384
Operating Income (Loss) (2,372) (565) 2,619 834
Other (Income) Expense
Interest Expense 890 932 947 253
(Gains) Losses on Early Extinguishment of Debt 155 2 (2) —
(Gains) Losses on Derivatives, net 286 135 130 313
Other (Income) Expense, net 126 54 59 6
Total 1,457 1,123 1,134 572
Income (Loss) Before Income Taxes (3,829) (1,688) 1,485 262
Income Tax Expense (Benefit) (1,021) (1,477) 733 166
Net Income (Loss) (2,808) (211) 752 96
Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests 263 245 137 111
Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Common Stockholders (3,071) (456) 615 (15)












Source: Adapted from Anadarko SEC Filing for March 31, 2019 
31-Dec-16 31-Dec-17 31-Dec-18 31-Mar-19
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash and Cash Equivalents 3,184 4,553 1,295 2,026
Accounts Receivable
Customers 1,007 1,222 1,491 1,553
Others 721 607 535 512
Other Current Assets
Inventories 313 316 235 254
Other 41 64 239 84
Total 5,266 6,762 3,795 4,429
Property and Equipment
Property and Equipment, gross 69,013 65,050 67,518 66,841
Accum. Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization 36,845 37,599 38,903 37,905
Properties and Equipment, net 32,168 27,451 28,615 28,936
Other Assets 226 2,211 2,336 3,006
Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets 5,904 5,662 5,630 5,622




Trade 1,617 1,894 2,003 1,946
Other 303 266 161 165
Short-Term Debt - Anadarko 42 142 919 21
Short-Term Debt - WES and WGP — — 28 2,000
Current Asset Retirement Obligations 129 294 252 277
Other Current Liabilities 1,237 1,310 1,295 1,340
Total 3,328 3,906 4,658 5,749
Long-Term Debt
Long-Term Debt - Anadarko 12,162 12,054 10,683 10,695
Long-Term Debt - WES and WGP 3,119 3,493 4,787 5,208
Total 15,281 15,547 15,470 15,903
Other Long-Term Liabilities
Deferred Income Taxes 4,324 2,234 2,437 2,624
Asset Retirement Obligations 2,802 2,500 2,847 2,876
Other 4,332 4,109 4,021 4,308
Total 11,458 8,843 9,305 9,808
Stockholders' Equity 15,497 13,790 10,943 10,533
Total Liabilities and Equity 45,564 42,086 40,376 41,993
Cash Flows from Investing Activities 2016 2017 2018 03/31/2019
Additions to Properties and Equipment (3,505) (5,031) (6,183) (1,389)
Acquisition of Businesses (1,740) 25 — —
Divestitures of Properties and Equipment and Other Assets 2,356 4,008 417 7
Other, net 147 (32) (216) (146)
Net Cash from Investing Activities (2,742) (1,030) (5,982) (1,528)








Source: SEC Filing - Proxy Statement on the Acquisition of Anadarko 
 
 





Exhibit 11: Selected Financial Data on Comparable Transactions 
 
 
Notes: (i) selected transactions are takeovers of oil and gas exploration and production companies completed between 01/01/2010 and 01/09/2019, 
with a deal size in the range $5-100 billion. (ii) median and average values exclude Occidental’s acquisition of Anadarko. 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Initial Offer Accepted Offer Second Offer Revised Offer Final Offer
27 September 2017 23 March 2019 8 April 2019 24 April 2019 5 May 2019
Purchase Price per Share ($) 61.22 76.00 72.00 76.00 76.00
Premium Over Day Prior (%) 22.73 75.80 53.16 18.77 4.51
Payment Type Stock Cash and Stock Cash and Stock Cash and Stock Cash and Stock
Cash Consideration Per Share ($) - $19,00 28.80 38.00 59.00
Exchange Ratio (%) 0.9500 0.8737 0.7076 0.6094 0.2934
Occidental's Final Ownership (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 71% 84%
Anadarko's Final Ownership (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. 29% 16%
Restricted to Financing Conditions Yes No No No No

























Announcement Date Target Buyer
Transaction Value
($ millions)
Transaction Value to Sales
(TV/Sales)
Transaction Value to 
EBITDA (TV/EBITDA)
05/09/2019 Anadarko Petroleum Corp Occidental Petroleum Corp 55,162 4.22x 8.05x
01/11/2018 Newfield Exploration Co Encana Corp 8,151 3.55x 5.83x
14/08/2018 Energen Corp Diamondback Energy Inc 9,145 7.20x 11.25x
28/03/2018 RSP Permian Inc Concho Resources Inc 9,204 11.25x 17.46x
08/04/2015 BG Group Ltd Royal Dutch Shell PLC 79,308 — —
16/12/2014 Repsol Oil & Gas Canada Inc Repsol SA 12,949 2.57x 5.88x
05/12/2012 Plains Exploration & Production Co Freeport-McMoRan Inc 10,173 4.60x 6.98x
Median 4.60x 6.98x
Average 5.83x 9.48x




Exhibit 12: Occidental and Anadarko’s Complementarity Acreage in the Delaware Basin 
 
 
Source: Revised Occidental Proposal to Acquire Anadarko on May 6, 2019 
 
 



















Exhibit 14A: Occidental’s Historical and Pro Forma Income Statement, in $ Millions 
 
 
















2017 2018 03/31/2019 Pro Forma
Revenues
Net Sales
Oil and Gas 7,870 10,441 4,004 6,517
Chemical 4,355 4,657
Midstream and Marketing 1,157 3,656
Eliminations (a) (874) (930)
Total 12,508 17,824 4,004 6,517
Interest, Dividends and Other Income 99 136 78 92
Gain on Sale of Assets and Equity Investments, net 667 974 7 33
Total 13,274 18,934 4,089 6,642
Costs and Other Deductions
Cost of Sales 5,594 6,568 1,345 2072
Purchased Commodities — — 365 365
SG&A and Other Operating Expenses 1,424 1,613 140 239
Other Operating and Non-Operating Expenses — — 238 606
Taxes Other Than on Income 311 439 111 217
Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization 4,002 3,977 973 2050
Asset Impairments and Related Items 545 561 — —
Exploration Expense 82 110 36 83
Interest and Debt Expense, net 345 389 98 516
Total 12,303 13,657 3,306 6,148
Operating Income (Loss) 971 5,277 783 494
Other (Income) Expense
Income from Equity Investments 357 331 73 137
Total 357 331 73 137
Income (Loss) Before Income Taxes 1,328 5,608 856 631
Benefit (Provision) for Domestic and Foreign Income Taxes (17) (1,477) (225) (205)
Net Income (Loss) 1,311 4,131 631 426
Preferred Stock Dividend — — — 200
Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Noncontrolling Interests — — — 100
Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Common Stockholders 1,311 4,131 631 126




Exhibit 14B: Occidental’s Historical and Pro Forma Balance Sheet, in $ Millions 
 
 
Note: “The selected unaudited pro forma combined financial statements […] have been adjusted to reflect (i) the completion of the merger, (ii) 
Occidental’s incurrence of $21.8 billion of new indebtedness to finance a portion of the cash merger consideration, (iii) the Berkshire Hathaway 
investment (but excluding the exercise of the warrant issued pursuant to the Berkshire Investment) and (iv) the Total transaction”. 
 









31-Dec-16 31-Dec-17 31-Dec-18 03/31/2019 Pro Forma
Current Assets
Cash and Cash Equivalents 2,233 1,672 3,033 1,752 3,804
Trade Receivables, net 3,989 4,145 4,893 5,310 7,188
Inventories 866 1,246 1,191 1,484 2,069
Assets Held for Sale — 474 — — —
Other Current Assets 1,340 733 746 724 806
Total Current Assets 8,428 8,270 9,863 9,270 13,867
Investments
Investments in Unconsolidated Entities 1,401 1,515 1,680 1,725 3,104
Property, Plant and Equipment
Oil and Gas Segment 54,673 53,409 58,799
Chemical Segment 6,930 6,847 7,001
Midstream and Marketing Segment 9,216 9,493 8,070
Corporate 474 497 550
71,293 70,246 74,420
Accumulated Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization (38,956) (39,072) (42,983)
32,337 31,174 31,437 31,900 90,291
Operating Lease Assets — — — 684 1,166
Intangible Assets — — — — 3,168
Goodwill — — — — 6,475
LONG-TERM RECEIVABLES AND OTHER ASSETS, NET 943 1,067 874 801 1147
TOTAL ASSETS 43,109 42,026 43,854 44,380 119,218
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Current Maturities of Long-Term Debt — 500 116 116 2,125
Current Lease Liabilities — — — 240 473
Accounts Payable 3,926 4,408 4,885 5,261 7,107
Accrued Liabilities 2,436 2,492 2,411 1,920 2,948
Total Current Liabilities 6,362 7,400 7,412 7,537 12,653
LONG-TERM DEBT, NET 9,819 9,328 10,201 10,203 40,809
DEFERRED CREDITS AND OTHER LIABILITIES
Deferred Domestic and Foreign Income Taxes, net 1,132 581 907 918 10,256
Asset Retirement Obligations 1,245 1,241 1,424 1,430 4,152
Pension and Post-Retirement Obligations 963 1,005 809 816 1,686
Environmental Remediation Reserves 739 728 762 755 839
Lease Liabilities — — — 465 732
Other 1,352 1,171 1,009 1,020 4,347
5,431 4,726 4,911 5,404 22,012
STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Common Stock 178 179 179 179 208
Treasury Stock (9,143) (9,168) (10,473) (10,653) (10,752)
Additional Paid-in Capital 7,747 7,884 8,046 8,083 25,071
Retained Earnings 22,981 21,935 23,750 23,795 23,326
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Loss (266) (258) (172) (168) (168)
Noncontrolling Interests — — — — 6,059
Total Equity 21,497 20,572 21,330 21,236 43,744
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY 43,109 42,026 43,854 44,380 119,218
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